Antecedentes. En el 2007 se legalizó el aborto en la Ciudad de México, acusando una elevada mortalidad materna por aborto.Objetivo. Analizar los datos generales de la mortalidad materna y por aborto en el país y en la capital.Metodología. Estudio retrospectivo, con datos obtenidos del INEGI. Cálculo de la razón de mortalidad materna general y por aborto. Análisis de correlación de Pearson y regresión lineal de los resultados. Análisis de tendencias de incremento y decremento anual. Desglose de muertes maternas.Resultado. Regresión lineal (...) sobre la RMM nacional (R² = 0.87) con tendencia a la baja; RMM por aborto nacional (R² = 0.49) con débil tendencia hacia la baja; RMM por aborto en la Ciudad de México (R² = 0.001) no muestra una tendencia hacia la baja.Conclusión. La despenalización del aborto en la Ciudad de México no mostró tener un impacto en la reducción de muertes maternas por aborto. El aborto provocado ocupa el 12° lugar de las muertes maternas en México. (shrink)

Using data collected from 280 full-time employees from a variety of organizations, this study examined the effects of employee perceptions of the behavioral integrity (BI) of their supervisors on job tension. The moderating effect of procedural justice (PJ) on this relationship also was examined. Substitutes for leadership theory (Kerr and Jermier, 1978) and psychological contract theory (Rousseau, Empl Responsib Rights J 2:121–139, 1989) were used as the theoretical foundations for the hypothesized relationships. Results indicated a negative relationship between BI and (...) job tension. PJ moderated this relationship such that it was weakened under conditions of high PJ. Implications for research and managers are discussed. (shrink)

This paper posits that ethical leadership increases important organizational and individual outcomes by reducing politics in the workplace. Specifically, we propose that perceptions of organizational politics serve as a mechanism through which ethical leadership affects outcomes. We further argue that the modeled relationships are moderated by political skill. By means of data from 136 matched pairs of supervisors and subordinates employed by a state agency in the southern US, we found support for our predictions. Specifically, we found that perceptions of (...) organizational politics fully mediated the relationship between perceptions of ethical leadership and helping and promotability ratings. In addition, political skill was found to moderate the direct and indirect effects. (shrink)

This collection brings together fourteen contributions by authors from around the globe. Each of the contributions engages with questions about how local and global bioethical issues are made to be comparable, in the hope of redressing basic needs and demands for justice. These works demonstrate the significant conceptual contributions that can be made through feminists' attention to debates in a range of interrelated fields, especially as they formulate appropriate responses to developments in medical technology, global economics, population shifts, and poverty.

Aim: Explore nurses’ values and perceptions regarding the practice of medical aid in dying. Background: Medical aid in dying is becoming increasing legal in the United States. The laws and American Nurses Association documents limit nursing involvement in this practice. Nurses’ values regarding this controversial topic are poorly understood. Methodology: Cross-sectional electronic survey design sent to nurse members of the American Nurses Association. Inductive thematic content analysis was applied to open-ended comments. Ethical Considerations: Approved by the institutional review board (#191046). (...) Participants: 1213 nurses provided 3639 open-ended comments. More than 80% of participants self-identified as white 58% held a graduate degree; and half were of Christian faith. Results: Values ranged on a continuum expressed through four themes: “Honoring Patient Autonomy without Judgment,” “Honoring with Limitations,” “Not until...,” and “Adamantly against.” Some felt it was a duty to honor the patients’ wishes, set aside own beliefs, and respect patients’ choices often with a spiritual connotation. Nurses held concerns about the process, policy, potential psychological harm, legal risk, and the need to learn more about MAID. Nurse who were adamantly against MAID associated the practice with murder/suicide and against religious beliefs. Disparate values were expressed about changing the MAID legislation to allow patient support with taking MAID medications and allowing MAID via advance directive. Conclusions: Nurses desire more education on MAID. There is not one universally held position on the nurse’s role during MAID. Healthcare policy/standards need to accommodate the wide variation in nurses’ values. Implications: Nurses desire education regarding their role in MAID. Nurses are encouraged to participate in policy discussions as the practice becomes increasingly legal. Managers need to expect that nurses, patients, and families will need psychological support to participate in MAID. Careful construction of policy/standards is needed to minimize conflict, moral distress, and psychological harm amongst nurses. Further research is needed. (shrink)

The practical aspect of ancient philosophy has been recently made a focus of renewed metaphilosophical investigation. After a brief presentation of three accounts of this kind developed by Martha Nussbaum, Pierre Hadot, and Michel Foucault, the model of the therapeutic argument developed by Nussbaum is called into question from the perspectives offered by her French colleagues, who emphasize spiritual exercise (Hadot) or the care of the self (Foucault). The ways in which the account of Nussbaum can be defended (...) are then discussed, including both a ‘negative’ defense, i.e. the indication of the weaknesses of Hadot and Foucault’s proposals, and a ‘positive’ one focused on the points in which Nussbaum can convincingly address doubts about her metaphilosophical account. In response to these analyses, some further remarks made by Hadot and Foucault are discussed in order to demonstrate that their accounts are not as distant from Nussbaum after all. Finally, a recent metaphilosophical study by John Sellars together with a therapeutic (medical) model developed by the author of the present article are suggested as providing a framework for potential reconciliation between all three accounts discussed and a resource for further metaphilosophical studies. (shrink)

On propose de faire dialoguer l’interprétation que Martha Nussbaum donne de la conception aristotélicienne de la vie bonne avec les lectures « perfectionnistes » de Michel Foucault, Pierre Hadot et Stanley Cavell. Ces lectures permettent d’apporter de précieux éléments de réponse à la difficulté soulevée dans l’appendice à la troisième partie de La Fragilité du bien : rendre compte de la tension, chez Aristote, entre un modèle de la vie bonne entièrement « humain », tel qu’il est développé (...) dans la plupart de ses écrits, et les affirmations du livre X de l’ Éthique à Nicomaque à propos de l’excellence et de la perfection (le caractère « divin ») de la vie théorétique. Plusieurs pistes de réponse sont explorées avant une hypothèse de travail permettant de concevoir de manière originale le rapport entre l’« humain » et le « divin » au sein de l’éthique aristotélicienne. (shrink)

En reposant la question fondamentale de la phénoménologie, et de la philosophie — la question de la donation —, en interprétant celle-ci non plus seulement, selon la pensée traditionnelle de l'Occident, comme apparition dans un monde mais comme l'étreinte invisible de la vie en son propre pathos, la phénoménologie matérielle soulève des problèmes nouveaux et paradoxaux. Trois d'entre eux font l'objet des présentes études : 1 / La matière de la conscience, l'Impression, n'est plus un contenu opaque attendant l'éclaircissement de (...) la forme intentionnelle, ne s'exhibant que dans l'Ek-stase du Temps : elle accomplit la Révélation en elle-même, dans sa chair affective. Au lieu de définir une discipline mineure, vite oubliée, la phénoménologie hylétique — matérielle — dessine la tâche de l'avenir. 2 / La possibilité de connaître la vie invisible donne son sens au problème de la méthode phénoménologique et exige que celle-ci soit repensée entièrement. 3 / La relation à autrui change elle-même de nature si, avant de pouvoir être reconnue au milieu du monde, elle prend corps dans la vie où naissent tous les vivants, l'autre aussi bien que moi-même — si elle est un « pathos-avec ». — Michel Henry —. (shrink)

Le thème “phénoménologie et religion” me pose doublement problème. 1) D’un côté l’orientation phénoménologique est quelque chose à quoi j’ai eu l’impression d’adhérer longtemps, par quoi je me sentais identifié même. Pourtant, je m’en sens de plus en plus séparé, par un indéfinissable écart stylistique au moins. De plus, je n’ai jamais accepté le virage à une phénoménologie de l’être-au-monde, qui me semble dominer l’espace français pour y fixer le visage et l’identité de ce que l’on tient po...

This article draws out the political implications of some of the avatars of ancient skepticism in modern fiction. It relies on Martha Nussbaum’s claim that fiction can provide some of the best lessons in moral philosophy to refute her claim that ancient skepticism was a bad influence on morals. It surveys references to skepticism from Shakespeare through such diverse writers as Isabel de Charrière, Herman Melville, Mark Twain, Anatole France, and Albert Camus down to recent writers such as Orhan (...) Pamuk and Michel Houellebecq. The most substantial treatment is of Naguib Mahfouz’sCairo Trilogy, which is interpreted in two ways: one, as an example ofisostheniaor equipollence in arguments on both sides of questions about gender in the Islamic world, and two, as the biography of a person who claims to be a self-conscious skeptic. Skepticism emerges as a multi-faceted concept in modern literature, but there are definite references back to the ancient skeptics, including mention of the name Pyrrhonism and knowledge of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. The political implications militate against dogmatic claims to truth and knowledge of a one-dimensional justice. (shrink)

Que la passivité nous constitue semble doublement établi. Elle est même désignée tant originaire qu’indéfectible. D’où la sait-on telle? De l’évidence et d’une critique. En l’évidence, nous la constatons, par la critique, Maurice Merleau-Ponty dit son caractère premier. La réfutation de l’idéalisme doit conduire à y consentir. Que montre-t-elle précisément? Que l’idéalisme est, pour nous, impossible, inéluctablement absent. Que serait-il? La stricte infidélité à l’égard de notre être. Être...

Cet article propose l’étude d’un cas (dans deux films de Fassbinder) de ce que je nomme l’ iconologie nostalgique. Celle-ci consiste en une certaine manière de faire retour, par le cinéma comme outil d’expertise, sur quelques chefs-d’œuvre de l’histoire de la peinture, le film officiant comme révélateur iconique d’invention pour les figures peintes et nous permettant de voir et d’interpréter, par rebonds, le tableau pour la première fois, c’est-à-dire d’un regard jamais actualisé avant l’opération filmique.

L’exercice de la pensée est animé par une constitutive tendance à la totalité. Contre l’initiale apparence de sa vacuité, ou même de son indétermination il faut cependant lui rappeler qu’elle ne se réduit en rien à un simple exercice formel. Sa puissance propre, la « vertu de la pensée » la fait tendre à la perfection (DM XV). Reconnaître et surtout accomplir cette tendance, telle est en nous la première exigence d’une originaire fidélité. Penser constitue en nous l’activité au sens (...) propre. À... (shrink)

Pour retrouver la réalité, il faut d’abord de cesser de la penser à partir de ce qui l’absente. Rien en vérité ne nous empêche de la connaître et de l’éprouver comme absolue présence. Aucun irrémédiable exil ne nous en sépare. Revenir à la plénitude substantielle impose cependant d’abandonner tout rapport d’extériorité, pour enfin redécouvrir que « dans l’absolu nous sommes, … » (664)). L’on ne pourra ainsi échapper à la vacuité qu’en se délivrant des scissions qui nous absentent, et nous (...) év... (shrink)

Que désigne « nature »? Assurément une réalité donnée, qui par opposition à l’artifice ne résulte ni d’un travail, ni d’une activité ou encore d’une volonté. Nature nomme tout à la fois une détermination ontologique, un être effectif, ainsi qu’une détermination particulière. Le terme ne prend en effet tout son sens que par la désignation directe du « naturel » en sa spécificité. Poser qu’« il y a » nature demeure insuffisant. La nommer, c’est dire ce qui est naturel. De (...) fait la thèse de la n... (shrink)

L’exercice de la volonté nous impose, semble-t-il, une fidélité conflictuelle. Faut-il en effet, accueillir et préserver en elle ce qui en fait la spécificité, la puissance de rupture qui l’arrache au donné? Faut-il, tout au contraire, l’exercer en vue du consentement, la menant ainsi, dans et par l’abolition du détachement, à la plénitude d’un accord? Deux exercices, et deux compréhensions, de sa nature et de son statut s’opposent. Vouloir, n’est-ce pas exercer une puissance formelle, intr...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nina Pelikan Straus RETHINKING FEMINIST HUMANISM Important challenges to feminist philosophy have been launched by Martha Nussbaum and Carol Gilligan. Taken together, Nussbaum 's TL· Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Phüosophy (1986)1 and Gilligan's In a Different Voice (1982)2 direct us to die consequences of feminism's critique of humanism, supplemented recendy by attempts at a union with Foucaultian genealogy.3 Each of these texts (...) provokes questions about the reliance on deconstructive theories, like those of Michel Foucault, in contemporary feminist discourse. In this essay I will indicate some of the limitations ofthat union and contrast it to the expanding possibilities generated for feminist thought by a revised discourse of modern humanism. The desirability of this revision will appear more clearly once we take up the quarrel ofsome feminists with the humanist tradition and realize that there is no satisfactory single account of what humanism means. Nussbaum's revision of humanism, for example, is based on a reexamination of human cognition, one which includes emotional responsiveness, traditionally associated with women, as a source of ethical knowledge. Gilligan's humanist revision suggests another variety of humanism, grounded in the claim that Freudian psychology's descriptions of the cognitive developments of men and women fail to account for the different approaches to ethical dilemmas expressed by women's voices. Nussbaum's humanism has classical roots in Plato, Aristode, and die Greek tragedies, while Gilligan's humanism is derived from modern psychoanalysis. Such differences in themselves illustrate humanism's long and pluralistic history. Although Nussbaum does not describe herself as a modern feminist and Gilligan does, each of their texts Philosophy and Literature, © 1990, 14: 284-303 Nina Pelikan Straus285 suggests how, respectively, a woman scholar's response to classical Greek tragedy and philosophy and a woman psychologist's approach to psychoanalysis offer reinterpretations of both feminism and humanism. Parallels between Nussbaum's and Gilligan's contributions to philosophy and psychology suggestan innovative study ofvoices, stories, and images which employ woman as a vehicle for a new approach to etiiics.4 Read togedier, they indicate ways that feminists can redescribe the humanist tradition without either succumbing to the essentialist doctrine which Foucault exposes as oppressive in its consequences for women, or by being seduced by Foucault's antihumanism itself. Nussbaum and Gilligan both expose what Annette Baier calls "a striking feature ofmodern moralphilosophizing"—namely, its "avoidance of the concept of love"5—and each suggests how that feature can be transformed. As linked meditations on unsolved problems of our own way of life, Nussbaum's project is to correct the "notoriously crude and hasty" Aristotelian "investigation of the potential of women for excellence " (FG, p. 471), while Gilligan's work is a response to the dire consequences of Freud's influential notion that "women's experience of sexuality and relationships" is a "dark continent."6 One outcome of feminism's use of Foucault's critique of humanism is the possibilityofits settling into a new orthodoxy or politically "correct" position used to measure degrees of feminist commitment. A better outcome is that feminist discourses which have assimilated Foucault's analysis of power may help to combat this threat.7 The threat is taken to be orthodoxy, and Foucault's discourse is characterized as a guarantee against orthodoxy's temptations. A more problematic consequence of die Foucaultian influence, however, is a devaluation of liberal feminist discourses about "human nature" in favor ofthose which follow Foucault by (in Foucault's words) changing the subject and asking instead, "How has the concept of human nature functioned in our society?"8 This change in emphasis depends upon a description of knowledge as inseparable from power—with Foucault's own texts as the most powerful examples of the emphasis. Michel Foucault thus becomes the Strong Poet whom some feminists incorporate or resist in their writings.9 This incorporation can circumscribe their approaches to feminist problems in ways that suggest traditional female bondages to founding-father texts from which Foucaultian discourse is supposed to liberate them. 286Philosophy and Literature The problem is then one oftemptation. Exercising power is pleasurable, and if we stop with the pleasure that assimilating Foucault yields, we... (shrink)

On a pu croire ou espérer, un temps, que les monstruosités de la Seconde Guerre mondiale étaient derrière nous. Définitivement. Or partout, à nouveau, on massacre, on torture, on extermine. Comment comprendre cette facilité des hommes entrer dans le mal? La réponse à cette question devient chaque jour plus urgente. Michel Terestchenko rouvre ici le débat. D'abord, en complétant la démonstration de Hannah Arendt : de même que ce ne sont pas seulement des monstres qui basculent dans l'horreur mais (...) des hommes ordinaires, trop ordinaires, de même, montre-t-il, il n'est pas besoin d'être un saint pour accomplir le juste et secourir des victimes au risque de sa vie. Héros ou salaud? C'est toujours une petite décision initiale, à peine perceptible, qui décide du côté dans lequel, une fois engagé, on se retrouvera in fine. Mais qu'est-ce qui explique cette décision? C'est là où l'enquête de M. Terestchenko prend toute son ampleur. En procédant à une reconstitution critique du débat central de la philosophie morale depuis le XVIIe siècle, aujourd'hui relayé par la majorité des sociologues et des économistes, elle montre combien est stérile l'opposition entre tenants de la thèse de l'égoïsme psychologique et défenseurs de l'hypothèse d'un altruisme sacrificiel. Ce n'est pas par " intérêt " qu'on tue ou qu'on torture. Ni par pur altruisme qu'on se refuse à l'abjection. Les travaux qui analysent les phénomènes de soumission à l'autorité, de conformisme de groupe ou de passivité face à des situations de détresse, invitent à comprendre tout autrement les conduites de destructivité. Tirant les conclusions philosophiques de recherches récentes entreprises en psychologie sociale et s'appuyant sur certains exemples historiques particulièrement éclairants - tel le cas de Franz Stangl, le commandant de Treblinka, ou, à l'opposé, les actions héroïques du pasteur André Trocmé et de sa femme Magda au Chambon-sur-Lignon -, l'auteur propose de penser les conduites humaines face au mal selon un nouveau paradigme celui de l'absence ou de la présence à soi. (shrink)

Recent studies reveal that violence significantly contributes to explaining individual’s facial preferences. Women who feel at higher risk of violence prefer less-masculine male faces. Given the importance of violence, we explore its influence on people’s preferences for a different physical trait. Masculinity correlates positively with male strength and weight or body mass index. In fact, masculinity and BMI tend to load on the same component of trait perception. Therefore we predicted that individuals’ perceptions of danger from violence will relate to (...) preferences for facial cues to low-BMI. In two studies in Colombia, men and women from Bogota, Medellin, and surrounding communities were shown pairs of faces transformed to epitomize the shape correlates of men with high or low-BMI. The images were of European, Salvadoran, or Colombian men. Participants were asked to choose the face they considered most attractive. Subsequently, participants answered a survey about their health, media access, education level, and experiences/perceptions of violence in study 1 and about specific types of violence in study 2. Results from both studies showed that women who experienced/perceived higher levels of violence preferred faces of low-BMI Salvadoran men. Preferences for low-BMI facial cues were significantly explained by violence, even after controlling for all other variables. These results may reflect women’s strategy to avoid male partners capable of inflicting harm. (shrink)

What is the history of philosophy? What exactly is this the history of and how is that history to be understood in relationship to philosophy itself? Can philosophy's history, on any of a number of diverse descriptions, ever be said in its own right to constitute a unique and genuine source of philosophical wisdom or insight? George Lucas sweeps aside the constraints of traditional methodological and cultural boundaries to reflect broadly on a variety of answers to these questions, as posed (...) by many of the major philosophical figures of the past century. Inviting a re-consideration of the work of scholars as diverse as Alasdair MacIntyre, Leo Strauss, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Bertrand Russell, Arthur Danto, Martha Nussbaum, Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor, Keith Lehrer and Jerome Schneewind, Lucas ranges widely over the history of philosophy itself in search of original, probing answers to these profound and perennial issues. (shrink)

Violence confronts us increasingly, everywhere: how are we to make sense of it? Its ubiquity begs the question of analytical differentiation. This article seeks to open the field by suggesting a fivefold typology: violence as loss of meaning; violence as non-sense; violence as cruelty; fundamental violence; and founding violence. The idea of analytically differentiating between types of violence cannot avoid the fact that sometimes victims are also perpetrators in other ways, and that even violent activity is not conducted only by (...) essentially violent subjects. Violence needs to be connected to modernity and to problems of identity formation and not only to personal or collective risk. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Deep TherapyDiskin ClayThe Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, by Martha Nussbaum; xiv & 558 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994; $29.95For three decades now interest in Hellenistic philosophy has been gaining among philosophers both in England—and its philosophical colony the United States—and in Europe. The principal documents of the Hellenistic schools have now been made available in both scrupulously edited Greek and Latin texts (...) and fine English translations by A. A. Long and David Sedley in their The Hellenistic Philosophers (1987). Conditions are right for the latest assimilation of this philosophical culture, whose conventional dates are those of the Hellenistic age—from the death of Alexander of Macedon in 323 B.C. to the suicide of the last of his successors, Cleopatra VII of Egypt in 31 B.C., but which in fact extends through the second century A.D. In the fracturing of the autonomous Greek city state and the new empires and cosmopolitanism that grew up in its place, in the turning inward of ethical thought and the simultaneous turning outward of science, the Hellenistic age holds up a mirror to our own. Especially congenial to philosophers in this country and in England is the radical skepticism that reaches from Socrates in the fifth century to Sextus Empiricus in the second century A.D.Martha Nussbaum’s The Therapy of Desire is very much a book for this age. Her topic is the “compassionate medical philosophy” of three of [End Page 501] the Hellenistic schools, the Epicurean, the Skeptic, and the Stoic. In focusing sharply on therapy, she leaves to the side—and on the outside—the connections that made Epicurean and Stoic philosophy systematic. But her awareness of the psychiatric possibilities of modern philosophy and what Michel Foucault called a technique de soi provide the contemporary context for the project of this book, at a stage when Freudian psychology is preparing to make its exit at the end of its century. Medicine is the only science that enters this book’s field of vision. Its thirteen studies (some already familiar) concentrate on the practical and therapeutic aims of Hellenistic philosophy and what the author terms the therapy of the passions, particularly the passions of erotic love, anger, and aggression, and fear of the gods. In The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (1986), Nussbaum took the side of Aristotle against Plato. Here she takes the part of the Epicurean, Skeptic, and Stoic against the ethical theory of Aristotle, who is impressed to illustrate the practical turn in ethics which Nussbaum explores in Therapy. Plato is glimpsed on the horizon of this book “standing on the rim of the heavens” (p. 23). What links the intellectual program of both Fragility and Therapy is Nussbaum’s keen and sympathetic attention to poetry as a vehicle for philosophy or as a provocation to philosophical engagement. Four of the chapters of this study are devoted to poetry: three to Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura; one to Seneca’s Medea.The ethical project illustrated throughout these studies is formulated by Democritus, who first enunciated the claim: “medicine heals the sickness of bodies; but wisdom rids the soul of its sufferings” (DK 68B31). Each of the Hellenistic schools Nussbaum studies repeated this claim. Unexplored is the medical end of the analogy and the degree to which this much invoked analogy (whose terms are fused in our word psychiatry) conforms to actual medical practice, with its pathology, consultation, diagnosis, and treatment (therapeia). Nor is not clear from the Greek record that desires as opposed to the individual who harbors these desires are regarded as the object of therapy. The Hellenistic philosophers were clearly concerned with “extirpating” desires and disruptive passions, but the object of therapy was usually not desire but the individual who is disturbed by desire (as Philodemus, On Plain Speaking 84.11 Olivieri makes plain). But occasionally by extension the passions are described as the objects of therapy (as they are in Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. 4.II.3 Smith).No one who has read Fragility will be taken aback by Nussbaum’s [End Page 502] invention of a... (shrink)

Les entretiens ici réunis portent sur les conséquences de cette révolution méthodologique qui permet la compréhension des grands aspects de l'existence, thème de nombreux essais de Michel Henry à partir des années 80 : action, ...

Michel Surya publie cette année un nouveau livre sur Georges Bataille : Sainteté de Bataille . Dans cet entretien, nous revenons sur certains des points abordés dans cet ouvrage : le rapport de Bataille à la politique, à la religion ou encore à la philosophie.

During the last forty years, France has undergone a profound transformation, social, political, cultural and intellectual. This article locates Pierre Bourdieu's position on the French intellectual scene during these years. Analysing the relationship between general changes and Bourdieu's positions enables us to understand how the discussion of ideas can be perverted into a kind of sociological terrorism.

À l'heure où tant de discours prônent des sociétés dites 'inclusives,' dans nos vies quotidiennes, la vulnérabilité est encore trop souvent perçue comme le versant négatif de l'autonomie, un moment de l'existence qu'il faut impérativement dépasser pour pouvoir construire l'identité d'un sujet libre et autonome. Et si, à l'inverse, la construction d'une identité forte ne pouvait advenir que grâce à l'articulation entre vulnérabilité, comme condition normale de l'existence, et autonomie? Fruit d'un travail collectif, cet ouvrage souhaite prouver, à l'aide de (...) la pensée de philosophes comme Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Henry, Martha Nussbaum ou encore Platon et Aristote, comment le déni de la vulnérabilité, bien que compréhensible, peut devenir "toxique" lorsqu'il n'est pas démasqué. Cela aussi bien pour l'individu que pour la société. Un livre qui croise de multiples regards, la philosophie, le droit, les sciences de la santé, la politique, pour éclairer la façon dont nos modes de vie et l'organisation de nos sociétés pourraient changer, y compris d'un point de vue pratique, si vulnérabilité et autonomie étaient considérées comme des moments indispensables et complémentaires du développement de l'identité du sujet."--Back cover. (shrink)

Roger Williams est l’un des créateurs de la tradition constitutionnelle américaine. Il fournit les bases d’une politique fondée sur un égal respect des consciences et l’équité religieuse qui résonnent jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Derrière son importante réussite politique, il y a une pensée aussi riche sur ces questions que celle de John Locke et nettement plus pénétrante quant à la psychologie de la victime et de son tortionnaire. Elle tourne autour d’une idée sur laquelle Williams se concentre avec un zèle obsessionnel : (...) la notion du prix et de la dignité de la conscience individuelle de l’homme. Il aide à voir pourquoi la persécution est si tentante et quelles attitudes émotionnelles pourraient être exigées pour lui résister. En développant en outre un compte rendu élaboré des compétences convenables aux autorités civiles et religieuses, il anticipe la position la plus célèbre de Locke. Il n’est pas extravagant d’y voir une esquisse de la notion de John Rawls d’une société civile impliquant un ensemble de principes moraux à propos desquels des gens avec des « doctrines complètes » peuvent se rejoindre dans un « consensus qui se chevauche ». (shrink)

El artículo muestra cómo J. Dewey entiende “lo religioso”, no como experiencia sepa-rada, sino como intensidad de cada vivencia que realza y expande su cualidad estética. La vida cotidiana constituye el reino del hombre sobre la naturaleza que exige recobrar la relación originaria con esta y, desde allí, con Dios. Esto implica vivir de primera mano toda experiencia individual, toda vez que conlleva ser interpelado por las si-tuaciones problemáticas. Se explica la forma de dicho movimiento de la experiencia.

RESUMEN El artículo muestra cómo J. Dewey entiende "lo religioso", no como experiencia separada, sino como intensidad de cada vivencia que realza y expande su cualidad estética. La vida cotidiana constituye el reino del hombre sobre la naturaleza que exige recobrar la relación originaria con esta y, desde allí, con Dios. Esto implica vivir de primera mano toda experiencia individual, toda vez que conlleva ser interpelado por las situaciones problemáticas. Se explica la forma de dicho movimiento de la experiencia. ABSTRACT (...) The article discusses J. Dewey's understanding of "the religious", not as a separate experience, but as the intensity of each lived experience, which enhances and expands its aesthetic quality. Everyday life constitutes the dominion ofthe human over nature, which requires reestablishing the primordial relation to nature and, from there, to God. This implies living fully every individual experience and being interpellated by problematic situations. The article explains the form of that movement of experience. (shrink)